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By George L. Mehren
The  major  purpose  here  is  to  suggest  specific  ways  in  which
impediments  to sales of American  farm commodities  to other nations
may be mitigated or  even  eliminated.  To do  this, it is  first necessary
to identify  the  factors  which  are  interfering  with  trade in individual
commodities  or to particular  nations.  Factors  impeding  foreign  trade
must,  of course,  be  one or more of the general  determinants  of trade,
and  nothing  else.  Policy  to  eliminate  impediments  must,  therefore,
involve  manipulating  one  or more  of  the  basic  determinants  which
govern  trade  in  any product  between  any  points.
The  general  conditions  for  trade  between  any  two  points can  be
stated  most  briefly  and  with  adequate  generality  by  considering  a
single  commodity  and  two  markets.  For  trade  to  flow  between  the
two  markets,  two  general  conditions  are  always  necessary:  (1)  the
price  of the commodity  in the importing  area  must exceed  the price
in  the  exporting  area  by  at  least  the  full  cost  of  transfer  from  the
exporting  region  to  the  importing  market,  and  (2)  the  importing
area  must have  means  of paying  for imports  in the  currency  of the
exporting  region.  If  these  two  conditions  exist,  trade  in  the  com-
modity  is  profitable  both to shippers in  the  exporting  region  and  to
importers  in  the  buying  area.
Impediments to trade must lie in one or more of four determinants:
(1)  relative  costs  of  production,  (2)  relative  demands,  (3)  transfer
costs,  or  (4)  means  of obtaining  exchange  for  payments.  Similarly,
policy  designed  to widen trade flows  must be aimed at one or more of
these  four  broad  classes  of  determinants.  Such  policy  must  quite
obviously  be  formulated  under  present  conditions  with  respect  to
particular commodities and particular markets. The impediments and,
therefore,  the  policy  implications  will  differ  among  regions  and
commodities.
It  seems  to me  insufficient  to state  that elimination  of dollar gap
or  attainment  of  convertibility  will  eliminate  trade  impediments.
This is  essentially  a  tautology.  Gaps are  symptomatic  of disequilibria
in one or more of the determinants,  and nonconvertibility  is usually a
protective device designed either to protect internal factor price levels
or  to  guide  internal  development.  I  doubt  that  some  of  the  major
barriers  to  trade  would  be  removed  by  elimination  of  all  tariffs,
quotas,  or  other  direct  barriers  which  either  raise  transfer  costs
between  nations  or lower demands  in importing  areas.  I doubt  that
the United States is a major offender  in creating or maintaining trade
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with  the political  necessity of maintaining  allies,  there  are relatively
few directions  in which  American  foreign  trade  policy can  move.
This  nation  can  do  nothing  about  reducing  costs  of  production
in such nations as Japan.  On the contrary,  it may be  politically  nec-
essary  to maintain  living  levels.  With physical  productivity  in many
lines  still far below  comparable  United States  levels,  and with  floors
placed upon factor prices, Japan has been deficit in dollars for roughly
60 to 90 percent of its postwar imports from the United States.  How-
ever,  by  a  variety  of devices  this  nation  has contributed  to physical
efficiency  of  production  in  many  areas  since  the  war  ended.  This
American  assistance  has  helped  such  nations  to produce  some  com-
modities  at  prices  low  enough  to  sell  commercially  in  the  United
States and to give Americans stiff competition in some foreign markets.
Given the other three sets of conditions, nations could be induced
to import more American farm products  if their wants for them could
be  intensified.  Certainly  improvement  of  quality  and  packaging  to
conform with import demands at specified price levels is sensible.  But
I  am  doubtful  that  a  few  energetic  salesmen  can  greatly  increase
American  exports  to  areas  where  the  major  reasons  for  low  trade
levels  are:  (1)  inability  to  produce  competitively  either  because  of
pegged  resource  prices  or low  productivity  preventing  the  earning
of dollars  in  trade,  (2)  high  barriers  designed  to  protect  exchange
positions--often  a  consequence  of  the  first  condition,  or,  similarly,
(3)  a desperate  deficit in dollars.
There  is  no  basic  objection  to  proposals  for  lowering  or  elimi-
nating  barriers.  It  is,  however,  a  political  fact  that  such  barriers
cannot  immediately  be  removed  if  inconsistent  with  internal  price
policies  of  the  United  States.  Indefinite  extension  of  multilateral
trading may not be possible in a cold war. And it is certainly true that
often fantastic barriers  are placed against American products in other
nations.  It  is  doubtful that  the protected  positions of some American
specialty industries could  be obliterated overnight.  Barriers  seem now
to  be  most  important  with  respect  to  such  areas  as  Europe  where
productivity-with  American  help-has  recovered  sufficiently  for
nations to earn foreign exchange  in fairly free competition. But again
in  some  Latin-American  and  Asiatic  nations,  trade  would  not  be
increased  dramatically  by  full  removal  of  barriers  because  the  im-
mediate  reasons  for  impeded  trade  are  not  so  much  barriers  as
relatively  low  productivity,  pegged  internal  resource  prices,  and
immediate  crisis situations  in exchange  balances.
The  government  of  the  United  States  has  certainly  made  vast
sources of dollar exchange  available  to other nations from "unusual"
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leadership in banking required  to protect  other nations against short-
run  emergencies  which  may  occur  if convertibility  were established
in  some areas.  But  we have  certainly  helped  other nations maintain
both their  exchange  rates  and their internal  levels  of living by grants
of dollars.
In  a  cold-war  world,  trade  policy  must  be governed  in  part  by
political  and  military criteria.  It  must  also  be consistent,  at least  in
the short run,  with major  internal  price  policy set by law.  The areas
in  which  feasible  immediate  trade  policy  seem  to  be  consistent  with
the  long-run  needs  of this  nation  are  reasonably  clear.
Efforts  to  develop  capital  and  productivity  in  other  nations  by
loans, grants, technical  assistance, or other devices should  be extended
insofar  as consistent  with  political  or security  goals.  Development  of
demand  seems  to me  to  be  a  less fundamental  reason  for trade  dis-
locations.  Elimination  of  barriers  might  increase  American  exports
by as much as  500 million dollars.
In many areas, especially Asia, it seems necessary to maintain dollar
balances  in face  of the  fact  that such  dollars  cannot  at the  moment
be earned.  Here it would seem sensible to stockpile critical or durable
materials in return for farm exports which can be moved without dis-
turbance  of  markets  now  held  by  friendly  nations.  Certainly  the
experiment  of  receiving  foreign  currencies  for  American  exports
should  be  given  a  trial.  Military  expenditures  have  been  and  will
continue  to be  a  major  source  of dollars.
Since  enhancement  of productivity  in  friendly  nations  can  ulti-
mately permit  them  to earn dollars,  grants of dollars  by any of these
methods  should  be  designed  as  much  to  develop  capital  in  other
nations  as  to remove  excess  supplies  from  American  outlets.
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